Abstract
The 1972 and 1973 oil price shocks, political stability and a promising future for Iran in the Middle East propelled the government to acquire  nuclear technology to establish nuclear power plants for electricity. Considering Iran’s development prospects, the move towards nuclear energy was deemed inevitable and was even recommended by the United States. Iran’s move towards nuclear energy was concurrent with India’s nuclear tests which cast doubts on the Shah’s real incentives for acquiring nuclear capabilities and raised the question as to whether the Shah’s dash for nuclear technology was exclusively for development goals? Did the oil price hikes infuse the Shah with a heightened sense of power and led him to deem nuclear weapons as essential for establishing his regional hegenomy and creating nuclear deterrence? To provide answers to these questions a review of historical antecedentsis necessary; the history of nuclear thought in Iran, the relationship between nuclear industry and development policies, US attitutde towards Iranian nuclear industry and other factors such as oil and oil crisis of the 70’s, along within ternationsl factors or even the Shah’s psychological traits. It seems the Pahlavi governments ought to strike a nuclear deterrence of sorts to say the least or to reach a point of no return and stand on the threshhold of making a bomb in the mid-term, not necessarily making it.